

Oblivious DNS Over HTTPS (ODoH): A Practical Privacy Enhancement to DNS

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
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
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


Do53: Plain-text UDP exposes DNS Messages




Most Widely Used Variant of the Protocol
(92% daily traffic to 1.1.1.1)


DoH: Encrypts Stub-to-Resolver Link



The Gaps in DoH that ODoH Fills



Centralization of
Services



Association of query
to clients




Privacy by Policy




Regulatory Concerns

The Gaps in DoH that ODoH Fills



Centralization of
Services



Association of query
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


Privacy by Policy



Regulatory Concerns

Components of ODoH (1/3)



- Prepare DNS Query requests
- Receive DNS Answer responses

Goals:

1. Be able to successfully encrypt and decrypt DNS messages
2. Be unable to decrypt incorrectly received messages.
3. Identify maliciousness or attacks when they occur.

Components of ODoH (2/3)



- Relay the encrypted requests to target
- Relay the encrypted responses to client
- Remove client IP addresses

Goals:

1. Remove client identifying information
2. Be unable to decrypt any messages from either the client or the target instances
3. Operated by an organization different from the target resolver

Components of ODoH (3/3)




- Receive the encrypted requests from proxy
- Decrypt the query and Encrypt the answer


Goals:

1. Successfully decrypt the query
2. Obtain the answer from a resolver
3. Encrypt the answer and respond to proxy
4. Be unable to identify the actual client requesting the information.

Building the ODoH Protocol - Starting at DoH



Building the ODoH Protocol - Proxied DoH




Network Security ✓
Query Privacy ✗

Client IP Address ✓
Client Query ✓

Client IP Address ✗
Client Query ✓


Building the ODoH Protocol - High Level View



Requirements: Proxy and Target are Non-Colluding


ODOH Protocol

Query (Q) is encrypted using the PK of the Target and includes a symmetric key (K_s)



Potential Colocation of Services

Formal Analysis




Lemma: An adversary is unable to associate a connection between client and proxy with the corresponding query unless both the proxy and target are compromised.

Identified and Fixed a Replay Attack in the IETF proposed ODOH Protocol
(Details in the paper)


Research Questions



What is the impact of ODoH on **DNS Response Times**?



How does ODoH Compare to other privacy enhancing protocols?



How does ODoH affect **Page Load Time** experiences?


Measurement Setup and Deployments

Resolvers:

1.1.1.1

8.8.8.8

9.9.9.9




90 Client stubs
- 10 per vantage point

Experiment:
21,000 DNS req/day
or 15 requests/minute

Average bandwidth:
480 Mbit/s


Clients:
1 core Intel Xeon 2
GHz CPU 3.75GB
RAM x86_64

Takeaway 1: Choose Low-latency Proxy-Target



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
Impact of Response Time due to Client Proxy-Target Choices



Random behaves better due to multiple http connection management of streams.

Choose a proxy on the same network path to the target.

Takeaway 2: Reuse Connections




Takeaway 2: Reuse Connections

Some leakage of client identity due to reuse of session keys


- **No sensitive information** in either cleartext or encrypted form is **leaked**

Possible for clients to configure and force new connections if necessary.



Takeaway 3: Colocation is Important


The targets hosted on Google Cloud have faster response times with Google DNS due to colocation of Google DNS within Google Cloud Services.



Takeaway 3: Colocation is Important


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Engineered into:
<https://odoh.cloudflare-dns.com>




Co-locating the Oblivious Target and the Resolver results in better performance.


Comparing ODoH with Other DNS Protocols




Comparing ODoH with Other DNS Protocols



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
Comparing ODoH with Other DNS Protocols



Encrypted DNS
Protocols:

DNSCrypt and
**Anonymous
DNSCrypt**


Comparing Other Architectural Variants



<https://odoh.cloudflare-dns.com/>

Protocol	Request Path	Security	Privacy
Plain DNS (Do53)	$C \rightarrow R$	No	No
DNS over HTTPS (DoH)	$C \rightarrow R$	Yes	No*
Proxied DoH	$C \rightarrow P \rightarrow R$	Yes	No
Oblivious DoH (ODOH)	$C \rightarrow P \rightarrow T \rightarrow R$	Yes	Yes
Cleartext ODOH	$C \rightarrow P \rightarrow T \rightarrow R$	Yes	No
Co-located ODOH	$C \rightarrow P \rightarrow (T+R)$	Yes	Yes
DNSCrypt	$C \rightarrow R$	Yes	No*
Anonymous DNSCrypt	$C \rightarrow P \rightarrow R$	Yes	Yes
DoH over Tor (DoHoT)	$C \rightarrow \text{Tor} \rightarrow R$	Yes	Yes

In Browser Measurements



Measurements taken from a single vantage point (Chrome using Local Stub resolver^[1]):

- Client node in a lab university wireless network (200 Mbps DL / 8Mbps UL)
- Experimental setup with on-path proxy
- 5000 random and top chosen websites from the Top 1M in Tranco dataset
- PLT taken after entire navigation page is rendered

Median Page load times increase by ~6.7% when using DoH and ~9.8% when using co-located ODoH services.

[1] <https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared>

Summary and Conclusion

1. Performance impacts in the protocol are **purely network topology effects**.
2. **Service co-location** will result in **increased response time performance**.
3. Client **choosing on-path proxy** results in higher response time performance.
4. Clients are encouraged to **reuse https connections** to avoid TLS+TCP handshake overheads.
5. ODOH has minimal total page load time impacts or perceivable user experience impacts.
6. **ODOH is a practical privacy enhancing protocol for DNS.**

Artifacts and Services Available

ODOH Rust Client	https://github.com/cloudflare/odoh-client-rs
ODOH Go Client	https://github.com/cloudflare/odoh-client-go
ODOH Go Target	https://github.com/cloudflare/odoh-server-go
ODOH Go Proxy	https://github.com/cloudflare/odoh-server-go
ODOH Rust	https://github.com/cloudflare/odoh-rs
ODOH Go	https://github.com/cloudflare/odoh-go
Production ODOH Target	https://odoh.cloudflare-dns.com/
Production ODOH Proxy	https://odoh1.surfdomeinen.nl/

Thank you

<https://blog.cloudflare.com/oblivious-dns/>

Paper: <https://petsymposium.org/2021/files/papers/issue4/popets-2021-0085.pdf>

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